

Managing Conflicts among Decision-Makers in Multiobjective Design and Operations*

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Abstract

We present a systematic framework to manage conflicts among multiple decision makers (stakeholders) arising in the multiobjective design and operations of process systems. Addressing such situations is particularly relevant in sustainability studies because many conflicting social, environmental, and economic objectives need to be considered. The proposed framework factors in the opinion of the stakeholders and computes a compromise solution that seeks to minimize a measure of their dissatisfactions. We propose to use conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR) as a measure of dissatisfaction as this provides a generalization of average and worst-case metrics considered previously in the literature. In addition, the use of CVaR enables us to shape the distribution of dissatisfactions and to avoid extreme conservativeness of worst-case solutions. A key advantage of the proposed framework is that it does not require the computation of a Pareto front and can thus be used to address problems with many stakeholders and objectives. Examples are presented to illustrate the concepts.

Keywords: multiobjective, stakeholders, disagreement, decision making.

1 Introduction

Almost any decision-making activity must resolve conflicts among multiple stakeholders. Conflicts arise because stakeholders have different opinions and perceptions on the economic, environmental, and safety metrics (objectives) that should be used and/or on how they should be prioritized [1]. As an example, in designing an infrastructure that supports an urban area; the community, local

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23 government, and environmental groups would like to find a solution that minimizes the compet-
24 ing objectives of investment, project duration, and environmental impact. Some stakeholders prefer
25 to minimize environmental impact, some other prefer to minimize investment, some others value
26 project duration and investment equally, and some other are indifferent. In other words, stakehold-
27 ers disagree on priorities. In addition, when expressing their preferences, stakeholders are often not
28 aware of how much a certain metric (e.g., environmental impact) should be sacrificed to improve
29 another one (e.g., investment). Moreover, metrics are often ambiguous, in the sense that they mean
30 different things to different stakeholders. This, in fact, is a key issue in the design of sustainability
31 metrics [2]. Consequently, when stakeholders opinions are not systematically managed, they can
32 leave a subset of stakeholders strongly dissatisfied. This situation can ultimately delay consensus
33 reaching and lead to arbitrary decisions.

34 The most popular approach for dealing with conflicting objectives consists on computing the set
35 of Pareto solutions (often called the Pareto front) and let an *expert* make a final decision by choosing a
36 "suitable" Pareto solution in the set (compromise solution) [3, 4, 5]. This approach has two important
37 disadvantages: (i) it is ambiguous by assuming that the judgement of a single expert is used to obtain
38 the compromise and (ii) the complexity of computing the Pareto set is exponential in the number of
39 objectives. Consequently, choosing a compromise solution can be cumbersome if not impossible, par-
40 ticularly when many conflict metrics must be considered. For instance, once a Pareto set is computed
41 and the trade-offs are obtained, an expert can try to factor in the opinion of the stakeholders when
42 picking a solution or a group of stakeholders will negotiate and try to reach consensus based on the
43 observed trade-offs. Such negotiations, however, are often performed in non-systematic ways and
44 they are particularly complicated when many metrics and stakeholders are involved. Consequently,
45 it is necessary to develop decision-making frameworks that factor in the opinion of multiple experts
46 in more systematic ways and that are capable of computing compromise solutions without explicit
47 enumeration of trade-offs (i.e., without computing the Pareto set).

48 Another approach commonly used in multiobjective decision-making is to give equal priority to
49 all objectives (i.e., weighting all objectives equally). This approach is equivalent to picking a specific
50 point in the Pareto set and therefore is ambiguous. Moreover, the approach is also unreliable because,
51 depending on the strength of the trade-offs, a slight modification of the weights can yield drastically
52 different solutions [6]. In other words, this approach does not capture the shape of the Pareto set and
53 thus might neglect solutions that yield high returns for one objective with few sacrifices for others.
54 Another popular approach in multiobjective decision-making is to prioritize objectives, as proposed
55 in [7]. This approach, however, also assumes that a single expert is involved in creating the priority

56 hierarchy and consequently it is ambiguous.

57 Ambiguity can be mitigated by considering the opinion (judgement) of multiple stakeholders
58 when obtaining a compromise solution. An interesting multistakeholder approach was recently pre-
59 sented by [8]. Here, the authors assume that stakeholders are polled to provide *priority rules* to be
60 followed. From these rules, a unique set of weights that satisfy such rules is computed and these
61 weights are used to obtain a compromise solution. A disadvantage of this approach is that it can
62 yield situations in which no unique feasible weights can be obtained that satisfy all the stakehold-
63 ers' rules. In addition, this approach does not provide insights into the level of dissatisfaction of the
64 stakeholders with a given compromise decision.

65 In this work, we present an optimization framework that systematically quantifies and mitigates
66 dissatisfactions among stakeholders. The idea consists of factoring the opinion of the multiple stake-
67 holders in the form of weights (instead of rules). Consequently, compared with the approach pre-
68 sented in [8], the proposed framework provides more flexibility. The framework is an extension of
69 the robust optimization approach proposed in [9] in which a compromise decision is obtained by
70 minimizing the maximum dissatisfaction among the stakeholders. A key advantage of the robust
71 approach is that it provides a metric to quantify stakeholder dissatisfaction. In addition, it does not
72 require the computation of a Pareto front and can thus be used to address problems with many objec-
73 tives and stakeholders. We generalize this approach by considering average and conditional-value-
74 at-risk (CVaR) metrics. This enable us to shape the distributions of the stakeholder dissatisfactions
75 and capture the statistics of the stakeholder population more effectively. We argue that this feature
76 is advantageous in certain applications. In addition, generalizing the robust approach using CVaR
77 and average metrics enable us to provide utopia-tracking interpretations of the different metrics in a
78 common setting.

79 The proposed approach provides a systematic procedure to inform decision-makers about the
80 influence of their opinions on the final decision and can help decision-makers *reassess* their priorities
81 and thus resolve and quantify the *cost of conflict*. Examples are presented to illustrate the concepts.

82 2 Approach

83 Consider a set of objectives functions $\mathcal{O} := \{1..O\}$ and the corresponding objective function vec-
84 tor $\mathbf{f}(x)^T = [f_1(x), f_2(x) \dots, f_O(x)]^T$. Consider also a set of stakeholders $\mathcal{S} := \{1..S\}$ and that each
85 stakeholder $s \in \mathcal{S}$ prioritizes the objectives according to the weight vector $\mathbf{w}_s \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{O}}$. We define
86 the elements of weight vector \mathbf{w}_s as $w_{s,i}$, $i \in \mathcal{O}$ and we assume that the weight vectors satisfy

87 $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{O}} w_{s,i} = 1$, $i \in \mathcal{O}$. Note that this definition of weight vectors assumes that a proper scaling of
 88 the objectives has taken place so that the range of all objectives $f_i(\cdot)$, $i \in \mathcal{S}$ is $[0, 1]$. This can be done
 89 by scaling the objectives using the coordinates of the so-called utopia point (the point at which each
 90 objective is minimized independently). For more details, we refer the reader to [10, 11].

91 In a sustainability context, objectives can be of social nature (human health hazard, safety hazard,
 92 jobs created), economic nature (net present value, return of investment, initial investment, budget
 93 allocations), and environmental nature (ecotoxicity, global warming potential, energy intensity, re-
 94 source use) [1, 3]. Stakeholders can involve government (federal, state, and local agencies); society
 95 (communities, advocacy groups); industry (investors, managers, technology providers); and so on [9].

96 Our framework implicitly covers situations in which a stakeholder s wishes to consider a sin-
 97 gle objective function. In this case, the stakeholder will set one of the weights $w_{s,i}$ to one and the
 98 condition $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{O}} w_{s,i} = 1$, $i \in \mathcal{O}$ guarantees that the rest of the weights should be set to zero.

99 A key observation that we make is that, if the stakeholder population is finite, we can interpret
 100 the weight vectors \mathbf{w}_s as samples from a probability distribution with finite support. In other words,
 101 the weight vectors can be interpreted as weight samples from the population of stakeholders. It is
 102 natural that each stakeholder $s \in \mathcal{S}$ seeks to solve its individual weighted optimization problem
 103 (based on her/his individual priorities):

$$\min_x \mathbf{w}_s^T \mathbf{f}(x) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{O}} w_{s,i} f_i(x) \quad (2.1a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } g(x) \leq 0. \quad (2.1b)$$

104 Here, the constraint vector $g(x)$ includes operational constraints and/or system models. The
 105 solution of problem (2.1) will yield an optimal solution x_s^* and a weighted cost for stakeholder s that
 106 we denote as $\mathbf{w}_s^T \mathbf{f}_s^* := \mathbf{w}_s^T \mathbf{f}(x_s^*)$. This weighted cost is *ideal* or *utopian* in the sense that it assumes that
 107 stakeholder s does not have to compromise with the rest of the stakeholders.

108 When compromise is needed, as is often the case, we define the *dissatisfaction of stakeholder s* at
 109 an arbitrary compromise decision x as $d_s(x) := \mathbf{w}_s^T (\mathbf{f}(x) - \mathbf{f}_s^*)$. From optimality of x_s^* and of the
 110 associated weighted cost $\mathbf{w}_s^T \mathbf{f}_s^*$ we have that $d_s(x) \geq 0$ for all x and for all $s \in \mathcal{S}$. Consider now that
 111 two arbitrary decisions \bar{x}, x yield $d_s(\bar{x}) < d_s(x)$ for a given stakeholder s . Thus, stakeholder s will be
 112 more satisfied under decision \bar{x} than under decision x . Because of disagreement, however, another
 113 stakeholder s' might be less satisfied under decision \bar{x} than under decision x (i.e., $d_{s'}(\bar{x}) > d_{s'}(x)$). We
 114 thus have that, given a compromise decision x , we can measure the *disagreement* among stakeholders

115 by using a measure of the dissatisfactions $d_s(x)$, $s \in \mathcal{S}$. Note that the case in which no disagreement
 116 at decision x can only occur when $d_s(x) = 0$ for all $s \in \mathcal{S}$. In the presence of disagreements among
 117 stakeholders, however, this situation cannot occur.

118 Our objective is to find a compromise decision x that minimizes a measure of the dissatisfactions
 119 $d_s(x)$, $s \in \mathcal{S}$. We can think of this problem as one of shaping the distribution of the dissatisfactions.
 120 For convenience, we define the vector of dissatisfactions $\mathbf{d}(x)^T := [d_1(x), d_2(x), \dots, d_S(x)]^T$.

121 The most straightforward alternative to managing disagreements consists of minimizing the av-
 122 erage dissatisfaction among the stakeholders. This is done by solving the problem,

$$\min_x \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \mathbf{w}_s^T (\mathbf{f}(x) - \mathbf{f}_s^*) \quad (2.2a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } g(x) \leq 0. \quad (2.2b)$$

Note that, because $d_s(x) \geq 0$ for all $s \in \mathcal{S}$ and x , we have that problem (2.2) is also equivalent to,

$$\min_x \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|} \|\mathbf{d}(x)\|_1 = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} d_s(x) \quad (2.3a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } g(x) \leq 0. \quad (2.3b)$$

123 In other words, the solution of problem (2.2) can be interpreted as a compromise solution relative
 124 to an utopia point given by the collection of the ideal stakeholder weighted costs $\mathbf{w}_s^T \mathbf{f}_s^*$. This def-
 125 inition of utopia point is not to be confused with the traditional definition used in multiobjective
 126 optimization in which the utopia point is given by the minimization of individual objectives [11].

127 Another way to address disagreement consists of minimizing the worst (largest) dissatisfaction
 128 among the stakeholders. In other words, we find a solution under which the dissatisfaction of the
 129 most dissatisfied stakeholder is minimized. This is done by solving the robust optimization problem,

$$\min_x \max_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \{ \mathbf{w}_s^T (\mathbf{f}(x) - \mathbf{f}_s^*) \} \quad (2.4a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } g(x) \leq 0. \quad (2.4b)$$

130 This formulation was proposed in [9]. It is well-known that the minimax problem (2.4) can be
 131 reformulated as,

$$\min_x \eta \quad (2.5a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \mathbf{w}_s^T(\mathbf{f}(x) - \mathbf{f}_s^*) \leq \eta, \quad s \in \mathcal{S} \quad (2.5b)$$

$$g(x) \leq 0. \quad (2.5c)$$

132 The optimal value of η is the worst dissatisfaction. Because $d_s(x) \geq 0$, a solution x of problem
133 (2.4) also solves the problem,

$$\min_x \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|} \|\mathbf{d}(x)\|_\infty = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|} \max_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \{d_s(x)\} \quad (2.6a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } g(x) \leq 0. \quad (2.6b)$$

134 Because we can assume that the stakeholders polls are obtained from a finite population, we can
135 measure the disagreement by using a risk metric such as the conditional value at risk (CVaR) [12]. To
136 this end we solve the following problem:

$$\min_x \text{CVaR}_\alpha [\mathbf{w}_s^T(\mathbf{f}(x) - \mathbf{f}_s^*)] \quad (2.7a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } g(x) \leq 0. \quad (2.7b)$$

137 Here $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ is the probability level. This problem can be reformulated as [12],

$$\min_{x, \nu, \phi_s} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \left(\frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \phi_s + \nu \right) \quad (2.8a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \mathbf{w}_s^T(\mathbf{f}(x) - \mathbf{f}_s^*) - \nu \leq \phi_s, \quad s \in \mathcal{S} \quad (2.8b)$$

$$\phi_s \geq 0, \quad s \in \mathcal{S} \quad (2.8c)$$

$$g(x) \leq 0. \quad (2.8d)$$

138 This approach penalizes the large dissatisfactions in the $(1 - \alpha)$ tail of the distribution. In other
139 words, for a given decision x , computing the CVaR of vector $\mathbf{d}(x)$ is equivalent to arrange the dissat-
140 isfactions $d_s(x)$ in increasing order, take the $(1 - \alpha)$ largest elements (the tail), and we average them.
141 The CVaR minimization problem thus finds the decision x under which the average of the $(1 - \alpha)$
142 largest elements are minimized. Consequently, one can show that the CVaR solution converges to
143 the robust solution as $\alpha \rightarrow 1$ (we take only the largest element corresponding to the most dissatisfied

144 stakeholder) and to the average solution as $\alpha \rightarrow 0$ (we average all the elements) [13]. Consequently,
 145 the CVaR solution has the important property that it covers the spectrum of solutions between the
 146 average and robust solutions and can help us shape the distribution of dissatisfactions. This is impor-
 147 tant, as CVaR allows us to prevent the extreme conservatism of the worst-case solution and to shape
 148 the distribution of stakeholders. For instance, in some circumstances we would like to explore if a
 149 decision changes when we minimize the worst-case dissatisfaction and when we discard the $(1 - \alpha)$
 150 tail of largest dissatisfactions. If the decision does not change, it would imply that the opinion of
 151 some stakeholders does not influence the decision.

152 3 Illustrative Examples

153 In this section we present a couple of examples to demonstrate the applicability of the presented
 154 concepts.

155 3.1 Generation Expansion

156 Consider a decision-making setting in which a community (stakeholders) needs to decide among
 157 three technologies (denoted as I, II, and III) for power generation. In doing so, the community must
 158 satisfy a given demand while trading off three objectives: minimize electricity cost (denoted as C),
 159 minimize carbon emissions (denoted as E), and minimize land use (denoted as L). Table 1 lists the
 160 coefficients for cost, emissions, and land use for the three technologies.

Table 1: Emissions, cost, and land use for each technology.

Technology	E	C	L
I	100	10	100
II	50	50	50
III	75	50	25

161 The coefficients are dimensionless and are used only to represent relative magnitudes of different
 162 technologies. Technology I has high emissions, low cost, and high land use (relative to the others).
 163 Technology II has low emissions, high cost, and medium land use. Technology III has medium emis-
 164 sions, medium cost, and low land use.

165 The weighted multi-objective optimization problem can be formulated as form:

$$\min w_C C + w_E E + w_L L \quad (3.9a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } C = y_I C_I + y_{II} C_{II} + y_{III} C_{III} \quad (3.9b)$$

$$E = y_I E_I + y_{II} E_{II} + y_{III} E_{III} \quad (3.9c)$$

$$L = y_I L_I + y_{II} L_{II} + y_{III} L_{III} \quad (3.9d)$$

$$D = y_I P_I + y_{II} P_{II} + y_{III} P_{III} \quad (3.9e)$$

$$y_I, y_{II}, y_{III} \in \{0, 1\}. \quad (3.9f)$$

166 Here, y_I , y_{II} , and y_{III} denote the decisions to install technology I,II, or III, respectively. Symbol D
 167 denotes the electricity demand and P_I , P_{II} , and P_{III} denote the power supplied by each technology.
 168 For simplicity, we assume that $P_I = P_{II} = P_{III} = 10$ and we set $D = 10$. Note that the demand
 169 constraint (3.9e) implies that only one technology must be installed. The objectives (C , E , L) are all
 170 normalized by their best and worst possible values (these can be obtained from Table 1) so that their
 171 value lie in the range $[0, 1]$. For instance, we rescale objective E as,

$$E \leftarrow \frac{100 - E}{E - 50}. \quad (3.10)$$

172 In Table 2 we present the average and worst-case solutions under four different polls from 100
 173 stakeholders. We assume that the polls are designed in such a way that the stakeholders express four
 174 different opinions: 1) their only priority is emissions, 2) their only priority is cost, 3) their only priority
 175 is land use, and 4) all three objectives are equally important. In a first poll we have $\{50\%, 50\%, 0\%, 0\%\}$;
 176 in a second poll we have $\{49\%, 51\%, 0\%, 0\%\}$, in a third poll we have $\{25\%, 25\%, 25\%, 25\%\}$, and in a
 177 fourth poll we have $\{0\%, 0\%, 0\%, 100\%\}$. The first poll indicates that 50% of stakeholders give full
 178 priority to minimize emissions and 50% give full priority to minimize cost. In the second poll, the
 179 number of stakeholders giving full priority to minimize cost dominates by 1% the number of stake-
 180 holders giving full priority to minimize emissions. In the third poll 25% of the stakeholders give full
 181 priority to emissions, 25% give full priority to cost, 25% give full priority to land use, and 25% give
 182 equal priority to all objectives. The fourth poll correspond to the special case in which all stakehold-
 183 ers give equal priority to minimize all objectives. In other words, in the fourth poll we have *perfect*
 184 *agreement among stakeholders*.

185 From the first three polls we can see that the robust strategy achieves the same worst-case dis-
 186 satisfaction for all technologies. In other words, the three technologies are optimal regardless of the

187 polls. Under perfect agreement (fourth poll), on the other hand, technology *II* is optimal and the
 188 worst-case dissatisfaction is zero. From the first poll, we can see that the average strategy predicts
 189 that technologies I and II are equally optimal. This is expected because we have the same number of
 190 stakeholders giving priority to emissions and cost; consequently, the solutions are indistinguishable.
 191 For the second poll, technology II is optimal because the number of stakeholders giving priority to
 192 cost is larger (by one vote) than those giving priority to emissions. For the third poll we have the less
 193 obvious result that technology II is optimal.

194 By comparing the results for the robust and average strategies we can obtain some important
 195 insights. First note that in the fourth poll with perfect agreement the robust and the average solutions
 196 are equal, as expected. From the rest of the polls we can see that the robust solution is insensitive
 197 to the statistics of the polls. While this feature might seem desirable at a first sight, it is not likely
 198 to be accepted by stakeholders because it implies that their opinions do not influence the solution
 199 (even if there is a majority of stakeholders). In fact, in this example, even a poll with a distribution of
 200 $\{1\%, 99\%, 0\%, 0\%\}$ will give the same robust solution. The average strategy, on the other hand, does
 201 account for the statistics of the stakeholder polls but it cannot guarantee minimization of the worst
 202 dissatisfaction, as the robust strategy does.

Table 2: Compromise solutions under different polls.

Poll	Strategy	Compromise Solution
$\{50\%, 50\%, 0\%, 0\%\}$	Average	y_I, y_{II}
	Robust	y_I, y_{II}, y_{III}
$\{49\%, 51\%, 0\%, 0\%\}$	Average	y_I
	Robust	y_I, y_{II}, y_{III}
$\{25\%, 25\%, 25\%, 25\%\}$	Average	y_{II}
	Robust	y_I, y_{II}, y_{III}
$\{0\%, 0\%, 0\%, 100\%\}$	Average	y_{II}
	Robust	y_{II}

203 3.2 Energy-Comfort Management in Buildings

204 One of the objectives of an energy management system is to minimize energy subject to thermal
 205 comfort constraints of a population of occupants (stakeholders) [6, 14]. Thermal comfort is difficult to

206 enforce because perceptions vary significantly from individual to individual as a result of variations
 207 in factors such as metabolic rate (e.g., activity, gender, race, age), building location (e.g., next to air
 208 damper, next to window), and clothing level. To address this disagreement, we can poll the opinion
 209 of occupants about their temperature preferences.

210 Consider thus the following stakeholder problem in which we seek to minimize energy demand
 211 while satisfying the stakeholder j temperature constraint:

$$\min E(T) \tag{3.11a}$$

$$\text{s.t. } T \leq T_s, (\lambda_s). \tag{3.11b}$$

212 Here, $E(\cdot)$ is the building energy that is a function of occupant's s temperature requirement T_s
 213 and λ_s is the Lagrange multiplier of the comfort constraint (3.11b). For simplicity, we assume that
 214 energy is a quadratic function of the difference between the building temperature and the ambient
 215 temperature,

$$E(T) := (T - T_{amb})^2. \tag{3.12}$$

216 We set the ambient temperature to 35 °C and we assume that $T_s \leq T_{amb}$. Clearly, $\lambda_s = \frac{\partial E}{\partial T_s}$ and
 217 $\lambda_s < 0$ if the objective and the comfort constraint are in conflict (i.e., energy increases as we decrease
 218 the temperature requirement T_s). In other words, an occupant with a lower temperature requirement
 219 requires more cooling energy. Consequently, λ_s can be interpreted as a comfort price. We can thus
 220 formulate the weighted multi-objective problem,

$$\min w_{s,1}E(T) + w_{s,2}T, \tag{3.13}$$

221 with $w_{s,1} := \frac{1}{1-\lambda_s}$ and $w_{s,2} := \frac{-\lambda_s}{1-\lambda_s}$. This problem is equivalent to (3.11).

222 We consider a poll of temperature preferences for $S = 1,000$ occupants in a building. The average
 223 preference is 22 °C, the minimum temperature preference is 15 °C, and the maximum preference is
 224 29 °C. All temperatures are below ambient temperature and we thus simulate a situation in which
 225 energy is used for cooling. Because of this, if comfort is not a concern, the energy required will be
 226 zero and the building will be set to ambient temperature. This also implies that, as T_s is increased, the
 227 comfort price λ_s will decrease and will be zero at T_{amb} . We thus have that the weight $w_{s,2}$ will tend to
 228 zero and $w_{s,1}$ will tend to one, reflecting the fact that a larger T_s implies a lower priority on comfort.

229 Consequently, polling temperature preferences can be interpreted as polling priorities of energy and
 230 comfort among occupants.

231 In Figure 1 we present the corresponding comfort weights w_T ($w_{s,2}$) for the occupants while in
 232 Figure 2 we present the Pareto curve of temperature against energy demand. Each point along the
 233 front is obtained by solving problem (3.11) for each stakeholder s . Note that these points represent
 234 the ideal (non-achievable) situation in which each stakeholder can reach their desired temperature
 235 preference without having to compromise with the rest of the stakeholders. In Figure 2 we also
 236 present the solution of different compromise decisions. The vertical line indicate the solution in
 237 which the stakeholders compromise naively by averaging their temperature preferences (average is
 238 $22^\circ C$). This solution corresponds to solving the energy minimization problem,

$$\min E(T) \tag{3.14a}$$

$$\text{s.t. } T \geq \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} T_s. \tag{3.14b}$$




Figure 1: Occupants weights for temperature-energy trade-off.

239 Note that this *naive* approach does not capture energy in the stakeholders opinions. The black dot
 240 next to the naive solution represents the compromise solution obtained by minimizing the average
 241 dissatisfaction given by (2.2). The solutions obtained by averaging preferences and minimizing the




Figure 2: Pareto front and compromise decisions. Vertical line is naive approach.

242 average dissatisfaction do not coincide. The reason is that averaging temperatures is not equivalent
 243 to averaging dissatisfactions (dissatisfactions factor in energy and not only temperature).

244 The compromise solutions located on the right-most end of the Pareto front represent are those
 245 obtained by minimizing CVaR for $\alpha = 95\%$ given by (2.7); and the decision obtained by minimizing
 246 the worst dissatisfaction among the stakeholders given by (2.4). Note that the compromise decisions
 247 move toward the maximum temperature preference (warmer building) as robustness is increased.
 248 Consequently, the CVaR and robust approaches yield much lower energy demands than do the naive
 249 and average approaches. From the naive approach perspective (without factoring in energy in the
 250 opinions) this result is counterintuitive because one would expect that at a higher temperature more
 251 people would be dissatisfied. From a dissatisfaction perspective as defined, however, a colder build-
 252 ing yields much larger dissatisfactions because some occupants actually care about energy. This
 253 illustrates how a more systematic management of stakeholder opinions can yield more efficient (and
 254 nonintuitive) solutions.

255 In Figure 3 we present histograms for the dissatisfactions of all the stakeholders. In the top graph
 256 we present the dissatisfactions when the stakeholders compromise by minimizing the average dis-
 257 satisfaction. Note the pronounced tail of large dissatisfactions. In the middle graph we present the
 258 dissatisfactions when the stakeholders compromise by minimizing CVaR and in the lower graph we
 259 present the dissatisfactions when the stakeholders compromise by minimizing the worst dissatis-

260 faction. Note that the tail of the distribution of dissatisfactions is reduced by CVaR and the robust
 261 approach reduces the tail further by penalizing the largest dissatisfaction. We can thus see that, in
 262 this application, the robust approach provides important benefits compared to the average approach.
 263 Moreover, the CVaR approach provides a mechanism to relax the worst-case solution.

264 Arguably, the need to choose among average, CVaR, and worst case metrics introduces some
 265 ambiguity in the decision-making process in the sense that the stakeholders must also agree that such
 266 a metric is the appropriate one. The level of ambiguity, however, is significantly reduced compared
 267 with standard multi-objective approaches that assume a single decision-maker picking an arbitrary
 268 point on the Pareto front. Moreover, the proposed approach has the additional advantage that it can
 269 manage many opinions and objective functions in a systematic manner.




Figure 3: Dissatisfaction of stakeholders under different compromise decisions.

270 4 Conclusions and Future Work

271 We have presented a framework to manage conflicts among multiple decision-makers. The frame-
 272 work enables the computation of compromise solutions in the presence of many objectives and stake-
 273 holders preferences without having to compute the Pareto set. The framework also provides a sys-

274 thematic procedure to manage conflicts by using quantifiable metrics of disagreement among stake-
275 holders.

276 We highlight that the framework proposed can manage objective functions in either deterministic
277 or stochastic settings. For instance, one can trade-off mean profit and profit variance. Our framework,
278 however, does not account for situations in which stakeholders can change their preferences based
279 on possible scenarios, as discussed in [9]. We will extend our framework to consider this possibility
280 in future work. It is also necessary to consider formulations under which the stakeholders not only
281 provide their preferences in terms of weights but also in terms of goals. This will give rise to interest-
282 ing goal-oriented multi-objective formulations. We are also interested in understanding under what
283 conditions the CVaR compromise solution gives a Pareto solution. This is motivated from the fact
284 that the average and robust metrics have utopia-tracking interpretations (under different norms). We
285 will look for a similar definition in the CVaR case.

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