Seminar Details:

LANS Informal Seminar
"Dynamic Power Markets - A game theoretic approach"

DATE: September 29, 2010

TIME: 15:00:00 - 16:00:00
SPEAKER: Aswin Kannan, Predoctoral Appointee, MCS
LOCATION: Bldg 240 Rm 4301, Argonne National Laboratory

Power market problems that are characterized by the presence of several generators competing amongst themselves necessitate modeling by means of a game theoretic approach. In addition, fluctuations in market demand require additional addressing with regard to demand and ramp constraints (dynamics). This work focuses on modeling and computation of equilibria arising in a supply function setting. Congestion and network constraints are modeled by means of the power distribution factor and the presence of the ISO (Independent System Operator) as another agent. The Nash game arising from the above setting is modeled under two levels of rationality. The bounded rationality framework gives rise to a complementarity problem whereas the completely rational framework leads to a more challenging class of problems namely the EPEC (Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints). The EPEC is further modeled as a more tractable nonlinear programming problem. Nature of equilibria arising from these instances are studied and comapred. Effects of ramp constraints, planning horizon and wind power penetration on equilibria are studied.


Please send questions or suggestions to Jeffrey Larson: jmlarson at anl dot gov.